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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the Case

A.

This case primarily concerned the binding effect 0f a settlement agreement entered into

between two companies

that operated

under the same name, as well as issues related breach and

damages. In 2005, following the realization that Appellant and Respondent’s rooﬁng companies

were operating under the same name, owners of Gem
and

Gem

Rooﬁng

State

&

State

Asphalt Maintenance, Inc.

Rooﬁng

(“GSRAM”)

Settlement Agreement (“TSA”) delineating boundaries by

GSRAM

and do business.

was eventually

dissolved, and

Which each company could

its

Gem

violated the

its

State contended that

TSA. UCI

trademark.

TSA, however,

The

is

refuted that position.

District

Gem

UCI

State

Gem

Court found that

was unable

the Judgment. In fact, all 0f

a successor t0

to establish

GSRAM,

is

name “Gem

bound by

UCI

a successor and thus

the

TSA, and

infringed

trial

upon

was bound by

Gem State’s claims were dismissed and it received n0 recovery.

The ﬁndings and outcome 0f the

State

the

any damages and thus was not awarded any

Court then held that there was n0 prevailing party and
either party.

solicit

owner created United Components

State further claimed that

UCI was

State”)

entered into a Trademark

Incorporated (“UCI”), which continued t0 operate under the assumed business

Rooﬁng.”

(“Gem

Incorporated

it

in

The

did not award costs 0r attorneys’ fees t0

and subsequent ruling on attorney fees are the

subj ect of this current appeal.

B.

Course 0f Proceedings
Appellant

1)

Gem

State ﬁled suit against

UCI on

July 20, 2018, listing six causes of action:

Breach 0f Contract, 2) Breach of Covenant 0f Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 3) Trademark

Infringement, 4) Unjust Enrichment, 5) Preliminary Injunction, and 6) Permanent Injunction. (R.,
pp. 11-20).

UCI

ﬁled

its

answer 0n August
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8,

2018, denying several allegations partially 0n the

basis that

UCI was

served

ﬁrst set 0f discovery t0

its

October

2018. (R.,

4,

interrogatories

and confer
respond

t0. (R.,

State that

it

p.

UCI 0n September

Then on October

3).

and requests for production.

letter,

pp 282-284). The

parties held a

would produce more documents

6,

2018,

0f discovery requests.

confer

set

Gem
UCI

(R., p. 3).

0f discovery requests.

letter,

compel.

UCI

served

unrelated t0 production that

(R., p. 286).

On November

owner, Jeffrey Flynn.

some

set

meet

failed t0 adequately

Gem

requests could not be

Gem

ﬁrst supplemental responses to

19,

2018,

UCI

21, 2018,

later

UCI

ﬁled

Gem

That same day,

would

(R., pp. 105-1 19).

State also sent a

UCI

felt

second

its

exist. (R., p. 278).

November

(R., p. 3).

Gem

State

responses on

its

phone conference, wherein UCI informed

States ﬁrst set of discovery requests. (R., p. 3).

compel.

The same day,
it

ﬁling

State ﬁled

for various requests, but

its

UCI

Gem

2018,

Gem

(R., pp. 48-56).

2018, With

speciﬁcally listing the discovery requests

On November

second

4,

17,

(R., p. 3)

supplemented because those documents did not

set

GSRAM.

not subject to successor liability for

its

responses t0

its

Gem

State’s

State’s

meet and
motion

t0

second supplemental responses t0

On December 20,

On January 28,

Gem

State sent a second

be the basis for

ﬁled

State’s ﬁrst

2019,

2018,

Gem

Gem

State

State ﬁled

its

deposed

motion

t0

(R., p. 3).

Both

parties ﬁled

motions for summary judgment, with

and supporting documents 0n February

6,

2019, and

UCI

Gem State

following with

ﬁling

its

its initial

motion

ﬁling February 13,

2019. (R., pp. 173-192).

The hearing 0n
entered 0n

March

two 0f Gem

the motion t0

25, 2019. (R., p. 5).

State’s interrogatories,

compel occurred on March

The order

directed that

and three 0f its requests

19,

2019, and an order was

UCI provide

complete responses t0

for productions.

Gem

State did seek

attorneys’ fees at this time under 37(a)(5)(A) with respect to certain requests for admission,
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and

the Court elected to defer ruling until the conclusion of the matter. (R., p. 364)

After hearing argument 0n the cross—motions for

its

Memorandum

Decision and Order.

unjust enrichment.

of good

and

faith

The Court

fair dealing,

summary judgment,

Gem

The Court dismissed

further held that

UCI

violated the

but that damages need

still

the Court entered

0f action for

State’s cause

TSA

be proven by

and violated the covenant

Gem

State.

The Court did

not rule on the cause of action for trademark infringement but stated an unregistered trademark

does not render

it

invalid. Lastly, the

Court did not make a ruling on

action for preliminary and permanent injunction stating such ruling

Gem

State’s causes

would be premature.

of

(R., pp.

369-392).

Gem

State, after receiving full

sanctions. (R., p. 394).

and complete disclosures from UCI, ﬁled a motion for

The following day, May

for sanctions with a declaration

31, 2019,

UCI

Court did speciﬁcally

Gem

requested by

damages.

state that

State,

(Tr. Pg. 13,

ll.

because there
20).

is

some way, and because

this

was

do a

the

did not believe

would

that

most

direct

objection t0 the motion

shift

Gem

it

439-443). The

(R.,

argued that

it

State

1-5).

The

a wise decision to grant the sanctions

an issue regarding the true nature and extent 0f

State’s

faith, that

it

had the

ability to

impose such

burden 0f proof onto the defense, and

sanction

would not be

(Tr. p. 13,

11.

21-25; p. 14

11.

1-9).

and obvious sanction, save for a concern about

3

11.

fair. (Tr. p. 15,

is

Gem

11.

8-

preserved in

was convinced information was being Withheld,

0f its own.
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had complied

had. (Tr. Pg. 12,

because in the electronic age, typically information

Gem

digital search

still

it

Court recognized that

no actual evidence of bad

The Court reasoned

entitled t0

it

2-7). Further the

it

UCI

and had produced everything

because there was

a sanction, but if granted,

its

of Terri Pickens Manweiler in support.

hearing for this motion was held on June 19, 2019, wherein
fully with all discovery requests

ﬁled

it

was

State agreed that

cost. (Tr. pg. 14,

11.

1-

25).

The Court denied

searches.

The Court

UCI

Court to believe
23).

Gem

State’s request t0 order

UCI

advance the cost 0f carrying out the

t0

further stated that should information

be discovered that would lead the

withheld information, then costs would be appropriate. (Tr.

The order reﬂecting these conclusions was issued on June
Almost immediately

thereafter,

UCI

p. 19,

24, 2019. (R., p. 6).

ﬁled a motion for reconsideration regarding the

production of privileged information as a part of the sanction order, along With a
support, and supporting afﬁdavit 0f Terri Pickens Manweiler. (R., p. 473-489)

held July

9,

A

memo

in

hearing was

2019, Where the Court immediately recognized the validity 0f UCI’S concern

regarding attorney—client privileged information. (Tr. pg. 50, 11.16—22).
protective order

client

12-

11.

was issued

(R., p.

As

545) and the motion for reconsideration t0 safeguard attorney

communications and privileged information was granted.

(R., p. 547).

order and order on reconsideration were ﬁled on July 11, 2019. (R., p.7).
the digital search, rendering

a result, a motion for

Both the protective

Gem

no new information or documents responsive

State conducted

t0

Gem

State’s

discovery requests.

Both

for judicial notice

was ﬁled by UCI

active listings of businesses

and exhibit

on July

parties ﬁled their trial briefs

lists

t0 recognize that the

Whose names contain “Gem

for both parties

Gem

accept the offer. (R., pp. 685-686).

A three-day

September

p. 8).

State in the

court

549-567; 569-586).

A request

Idaho Secretary 0f State has 387 current
State.” (R. pp. 584-618).

were ﬁled 0n July 23, 2019.

submitted an Offer of Judgment t0

2019. (R.,

16, 2019. (R., pp.

(R., p. 8). Prior to trial,

amount of $5,000.
trial

was

Witness

held,

Gem

lists

UCI

State declined to

commencing on August

5,

The ﬁnal judgment and ﬁndings of fact and conclusions 0f law were entered 0n

17, 2019. (R., pp. 624-647).

damages, and as such

it

The Court held

was awarded nothing on
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its

Gem

State did not produce evidence 0f

claims for breach 0f contract and breach of

covenant good

faith

and

fair dealing. (R., p. 647). Further, the

would be improper because 0f a
damages.

(R., pp.

could not meet

does

it

failure to

show a

Court held that any injunction

threat of irreparable injury 0r prove

634-635). Lastly, the trademark claims were dismissed because

its

burden 0f proof 0n ﬁrst use, and b) did not have a current

have a valid

common law

trademark because

it is

any actual

Gem

State, a)

registration,

nor

primarily geographically descriptive

With no evidence 0f secondary meaning. (R. pp 638-644).

Gem

State timely appealed the

Judgment.

On

reimbursement for
2019,

Gem

UCI

July 19, 2019,

all

State ﬁled

costs

its

ﬁled

its

and fees pursuant

for costs

t0

12,

rej ected

and attorneys’

by

fees,

seeking

On

July 24,

attorneys’ fees, seeking attorneys’ fees for

the District Court.

2019, and the Court entered

and attorneys’ fees 0n December

costs

Idaho Code Section 12—120(3).

memorandum 0f costs and

discovery Violations that were previously

was held 0n November

memorandum 0f

its

A hearing on the matter

Order denying both

13, 2019. (R., pp. 863-874).

parties’

UCI

motions

timely ﬁled

its

Notice of Cross-Appeal on the attorney fees issue on December 24, 2019. (R., pp. 875-878).
C.

Concise Statement 0f Facts
Jeffery Flynn started a

called

Gem

State

Rooﬁng.

rooﬁng company

(R., p. 626).

in the early 1980’s in

Nampa,

Idaho, which he

Flynn moved to Boise in 1987 and expanded his rooﬁng

business t0 include asphalt maintenance. (R., p. 189). In 1995, Flynn and his wife Michelle
Flynn, acting as directors, created Flynn, Inc. and ﬁled a Certiﬁcate of Incorporation With the

Idaho Secretary 0f
Business

State. (R., p. 626; 194). In 1997,

Name With the

company was

Rick Silvia ﬁled a Certiﬁcate 0f Assumed

Idaho Secretary of State for his rooﬁng business, Which declared that his

operating under the

name “Gem

an Articles of Amendment to change Flynn,
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State

Inc. t0

Rooﬁng.”

Gem

State

(R., p. 626).

Rooﬁng

In 1998, Flynn ﬁled

& Asphalt Maintenance,

Inc. (R., p. 627). In 1999,

Flynn ﬁled a Certiﬁcate 0f Assumed Business

GSRAM would d0 business under the name “Gem
ﬁled Articles 0f Incorporation for

Rooﬁng
State

Inc.

State

Rooﬁng

Rooﬁng.”

Inc. (R., p. 627). Since

stating that

In 2000, Silvia

2000,

Gem

State

name “Gem

(R., p. 627).

On December

29, 2004, the State of Idaho issued a Certiﬁcate of Registration of

Trademark Service Mark

t0

GSRAM

stating that the ﬁrst use

trademark would expire 0n December 29, 2014.

Registration

(R., p. 627).

has primarily conducted business in Blaine County, Idaho under the

Rooﬁng.”

that the

Gem

State

Name

showed

that the

Trademark assigned

to

0f the trademark was in 1985 and

(R.,

p.

627).

The Certiﬁcate 0f

GSRAM was the following:

Mm
GEM

ROOFING

On December
2024. (R.,

until

December

29,

p. 627).

On May
Services

UCI and renewed

2014, the trademark was assigned to

1,

Mark

trademark was

2,

to

2002, the State of Idaho Issued a Certiﬁcate of Registration of Trademark

Gem

May

2,

State stating the ﬁrst use

2012. (R.,

p.

627).

was November 1997 and

expiration of

The Certiﬁcate of Registration showed

that the

trademark assigned to Plaintiff was the following:

The
t0

registration for the trademark has not

show when

it

ﬁrst

been renewed.

(R., p. 627).

became aware 0f UCI doing business

actual ﬁrst use date in Blaine County. (TL, p. 131,
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11.

as

“Gem

Gem

State

10-19). There

is

State

was only

able

Rooﬁng,” and not

n0 evidence

the

that either

party has ever obtained a registered trademark for the

name “Gem

State

There are 387 businesses in Idaho using 0r that have used the name
State”

is

Rooﬁng.”

“Gem

(R., p. 628).

State,”

and

“Gem

a well-known nickname for the State 0f Idaho. (R., pp. 584-618; 628).

In 2005, following the realization that their

rooﬁng companies were operating under the same

GSRAM

entered into an agreement delineating boundaries

Gem

name, the owners 0f

State

by which each company could

names

that the “parties’

and

solicit

and d0 business.

(R., p. 628).

The

recitals

by agreeing not

business 0r advertise in the other’s primary market.” (R., p. 628). Under the

Gem

State Boise

would not

d0

the parties

“advertise or solicit business in Blaine County, including but
list

0f examples, telephone directory advertising,

radio or television advertising, billboards, ﬂyers, signs, or

express 0r implied that

Gem

TSA

to

that:

not limited t0 by, as a non-exhaustive

b.

state

0f confusion as t0 source, origin, and sponsorship 0f the

services” and that the parties “wish t0 resolve this matter Without litigation

a.

TSA

are confusingly similar t0 each other and the parties provide similar

services, leading t0 a likelihood

agreed (in part)

0f the

it

by making any

indication,

performs services in Blaine County.”

would not “perform any services in Blaine County except (i) warranty
and maintenance work and repeat customer business for the former customers listed in
paragraph 3(a), 2 and (ii) work for public entity in Idaho that is put out for bid among
State Boise

qualiﬁed contractors; Including advanced maintenance services.
c.

“If either party receives request for

Agreement,
(R,. p.

7.

268-269)

it

(Tr.

work

that

it is

prohibited from performing under this

will direct the person or entity requesting the

EX.

Relevant portions of the

1).

work t0

the other party.”

TSA include:

Neither party shall oppose the other party’s State 0f Idaho trademark registrations
dated
29,

May

2004

2,

2002

in the case

in the case

of

Gem

of

State

Gem

State

Rooﬁng,

Inc.,

and dated December

Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance,

Inc.

Gem

State

Inc., agrees and consents t0 Gem State Rooﬁng,
and registration 0f the word mark “Gem State Rooﬁng”
effective in Blaine County; Gem State Rooﬁng, Inc., agrees and consents t0 Gem
State Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance, Inc.’s concurrent use and registration 0f the

Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance,
Inc.’s concurrent use

word mark “Gem

State

Rooﬁng”

2(a).
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effective in the counties listed in subparagraph

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, this agreement is solely for the
beneﬁt 0f the parties hereto and no other person or entity is entitled to rely upon
or beneﬁt from this Agreement 0r any term herein. ..

8.

(Tr.

or

EX.

Nowhere

1, p. 3).

afﬁrm the

and consent

document does the agreement obligate

actual validity of the

t0 the use

common law

trademark

name “Gem

“Gem

State

it

does not obligate either party t0 recognize

Rooﬁng” nor does

State

Rooﬁng”

either party to recognize

trademark, the conditions are merely to agree

0f registered marks. Further,

a valid trademark in the

common law

in the

TSA make

the

reference to the

0r obligate either party t0 recognize

its

validity.

p. 629). In

order to

(Tr. EX. 1).

GSRAM
resolve

its

had incurred signiﬁcant tax

tax liability, the

new name.

with a

IRS directed Flynn
In 2012,

(R., p. 629).

Flynn created UCI, which continued
State

Rooﬁng.”

After the

Gem

liability in the

t0 dissolve

GSRAM

to operate

GSRAM

was dissolved

TSA was

work was done

signed, but before the

for Pioneer

as directed

commencement of this

a

new company

by

the IRS,

and

“Gem

UCI was

litigation,

UCI

(operating as

projects in Blaine County. (R., p. 629).

West Property Management, who

Maintenance Services, to which

The

start

(R., p. 629).

Court held that one of the projects was not a Violation of the TSA.

630).

and

under the same assumed business name,

Rooﬁng) had worked on four rooﬁng

State

year 2010. (R.,

(R., p. 630).

is

The permissible

the successor to

Advance

allowed t0 provide rooﬁng services per the TSA.

three jobs not speciﬁcally listed in the

TSA as permissible

The

(R.,

p

are as follows:

A) Brashears Sons/Shay Construction
B) Kerry Armstrong
C) Animal Shelter 0f the Wood River Valley
(R., pp.

October

629-630).

13,

201

1,

client speciﬁcally

UCI performed rooﬁng

services for Brashears Sons and

and was paid $17,424 for
reached out t0
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UCI

its

work.

(R., p.

630)

UCI

Shay Construction 0n

did not solicit this job, the

because they had a positive experience working With

UCI

on a project located

in

Twin

Falls, Idaho. (R., p. 630).

The job completed

occurred in Ketchum, Idaho, in 2017 for the amount 0f $750. (R.,

worked

for

Kerry Armstrong on

Gem

14-21). In the year 2017,

p. 169,

11.

(“McAlvain”)

least

UCI

t0

11.

11.

22-24;

Wood River Animal

Shelter. (R.,

UCI had

sustained at

Flynn and Kerrie Kuhn (UCI’S Corporate Secretary) testiﬁed that

manager

for

this project, at the

McAlvain, testiﬁed
this project

Shore Lodge in McCall, Idaho.

were ever alleged
similar names.

t0

that

because

(R., p. 630).

have been awarded

The documents with

the

t0

time 0f testifying. (R.,

McAlvain speciﬁcally
it

UCI

p. 630).

solicited

Tracey Felix, a

and wanted

UCI

because of any confusion regarding the party’s

name “Gem

employees. (Trial Tr.

Since the

UCI

TSA was

jobs in Blaine County.

It

State

Rooﬁng,” namely the subcontract

p. 117,

11.

UCI on

the documents, and the

1-17). Further, there

was no evidence,

shut

down

Gem

State to

declined t0 perform as the roofer. (R., p. 368).
signed,

did not

proﬁt as result of those bids.

GSRAM was

t0

This job, and neither of the other two for that matter,

presented in any form, that would suggest these three clients would have hired

complete the work had

UCI

had a positive experience working with UCI 0n

0f acknowledgement, also contained the address of

signatures of known

lost

State also

(Trial Tr. p. 169,

in proﬁts. (Trial Tr. p. 168,

perform over $200,000 in rooﬁng work on the

d0 the rooﬁng work 0n

letter

and was paid more than $750.

had a $65,000 increase

Gem

p. 630).

bid 0n and was awarded a contract with McAlvain Construction, Inc.

$12,000 in losses on

project

State

Kerry Armstrong

7-9).

Finally,

p. 630).

this proj ect,

for

UCI

(operating as

Gem

State

Rooﬁng) bid 0n four

additional

win those bids and consequently did not receive any income 0r

(R., p. 631).

UCI

did not believe

it

was bound by

the

TSA because

as part 0f the deal With the IRS. (R., p. 631). Silvia did not testify as t0

proﬁts or costs, but rather testiﬁed as t0 his gross revenue and proﬁt from the years 2000 to
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2018. (R.,

p.

631).

Gem

State experienced a drop in business in 2008,

thereafter. (R., p., 63 1). Silvia testiﬁed that this

the fact that

despite

UCI was

its

for

few years

drop was likely due t0 the economic crash and t0

doing business under the same name as his company in Blaine County,

no evidence of

State setting forth

and

10st

proﬁt on that account.

(R., p. 631).

The

exhibit prepared

gross revenue, proﬁt, and proﬁt margin, shows that

its

by

Gem

proﬁt margin has

increased overall in 18 years, With 2018, being the highest proﬁt margin ever for the business at

over 56%. (R.,

p. 631).
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ISSUES PRESENTED

II.

UCI will not restate Gem

State’s issues

ON APPEAL

0n appeal, however the issues 0n

its

Cross Appeal

are as follows:

1.

Did the

2.

Did

3.

Did

District

Court

the District Court err in denying

the District Court err,

attorneys’ fees

v.

alternate,

after the offer

status t0

for costs

UCI?

and attorneys’ fees?

by denying UCI’S request
ofjudgment was made?

for

STANDARD OF REVIEW

appellate court will set aside a

erroneous. Neider

UCI’S motion

in the

and costs incurred

III.

The

by denying prevailing party

err

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact only if they are clearly

Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003). In deciding Whether

ﬁndings are clearly erroneous, the appellate court determines whether the ﬁndings are supported

by

substantial

trier

and competent evidence.

0f fact would accept

been proven.

Ransom

v.

it

Id.

and rely upon

it

Topaz Marketing,

Substantial and competent evidence

support a conclusion.” Henderson
631, 213 P.3d 718, 721 (2009).

is

v.

It is

Evidence

is

in determining

if

a reasonable

whether a disputed point 0f fact has

L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006).

“relevant evidence that a reasonable

Eclipse Trajﬁc Control

mind might accept

t0

and Flagging, Ina, 147 Idaho 628,

the province 0f the district judge acting as trier of fact t0

weigh conﬂicting evidence and testimony and

to

judge the credibility of the Witnesses. If the

ﬁndings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even
not be overturned 0n appeal. Benninger

The

regarded as substantial

v.

if the

evidence

is

conﬂicting, they will

Deriﬁeld, 142 Idaho 486, 589, 129 P.3d 1238 (2006).

appellate court exercises free review 0f the District Court’s conclusions 0f

law

t0

determine Whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and whether the legal conclusions
are sustained

by

the facts found. Neider, 138 Idaho at 506, 65 P.3d at 528.
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The

trial

Thornton
a

trial

court has discretion

when determining an award 0f

costs

and attorney’s

Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 315, 385 P.3d 856, 870 (2016).

v.

court’s decisions,

When

fees.

reviewing

and whether there was an abuse of discretion, a three-step inquiry

employed: (1) whether the

trial

is

court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)

Whether that court acted Within the outer boundaries 0f such discretion and consistently With any

and

legal standards applicable to speciﬁc choices;

(3)

the exercise of reason. Idaho Military Historical Soc

Whether the court reached

’y,

Inc.

its

decision

by

Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d

v.

1072 (2014).
IV.

1.

The

T0 Grant Iniunctive
Manifest Abuse Of Discretion.

District Court’s Refusal

Constitute

The

ARGUMENT

District

A

Court did not

err in refusing t0 grant

Gem

Relief

T0 Gem

State Does

State injunctive relief. Idaho

Not

Rule

0f Civil Procedure 65 governs preliminary injunctions. The relevant portion 0f the rule reads:

Grounds

for Preliminary Injunction.

A preliminary

injunction

may be

granted

in the following cases:

When

appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled t0 the relief
demanded, and that relief, or any part of it, consists 0f restraining the commission
(1)

0r

it

continuance

of the acts complained

0f,

either

for

a

limited period

or

perpetually;

when

appears by the complaint 0r afﬁdavit that the commission 0r
continuance 0f some act during the litigation would produce waste, 01‘ great 0r
(2)

it

irreparable injury to the plaintiff;

(3)

When

it

appears during the litigation that the defendant

procuring 0r allowing t0 be done, or

is

plaintiff‘s rights, respecting the subject

is

doing, threatening,

about to do, some act in Violation 0f the

of the action, and the action

may make

the

requested judgment ineffectual;
I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1), (2),

&

(3).

The

trial

court has discretion t0 grant or deny an injunction and an

appellate court will not interfere absent manifest abuse 0f discretion. Harris
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v.

Cassia County,

106 Idaho 513, 517, 681 P2d 988, 992 (1984). Injunctions should be issued only where
irreparable injury

is

actually threatened.”

0 ’Boskey v.

& Loan Ass ’n ofBoise,

First Fed. Sav.

112

Idaho 1002, 1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306 (1987). Where the conduct causing injury has been
discontinued the dispute

is

moot then

the injunction should be denied. Id.

injunction has the burden 0f proving a right thereto.

C0.,

89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965).

the right

is

very clear and

it

An

First,

Gem

Lawrence Warehouse C0.

injunction

is

State sought both a preliminary injunction

Gem

burden of proof as

its

Gem

in refusing t0 grant

or

was

t0

any threat of irreparable

State’s request.

at risk for irreparable injury

evidence demonstrated that

Gem

At

trial,

breach the

TSA by

t0

and a permanent

and during

injury,

Gem State

refusal.”

One 0f

v.

trial,

Rule

argument for the

Gem

State did not

and the District Court did not

did not demonstrate that

it

State’s proﬁt

err

suffered,

margin had overall been increasing for the over

Gem

its

State failed t0 present

corresponding losses. Further, during 2018,

Gem

UCI

did

doing work for three clients that were not speciﬁcally excluded in the TSA,

its

no evidence existed

proﬁts would have been had

it

t0 infer

Gem

State

been awarded

would have gotten

the customers, Kerry Armstrong,
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had

also hired

the

that work. A11 three clients

had speciﬁcally contacted UCI because they had positive experiences 0n previous jobs
counties.

Evans

injunction.

highest proﬁt margin at over 56%. While the Court held that

the Court properly concluded that

same work 0r what

its

0n account 0f UCI’S conduct. Instead, the only relevant

any evidence regarding UCI’S proﬁts and
its

Rudio Lumber

100 (1929).

P. 99,

the past 14 years, With a dip that coincided With the great recession.

State experienced

from

State did not provide

permanent injunction. Based 0n the evidence presented up
carry

ﬂow

47 Idaho 267, 270, 275

65 solely applies t0 preliminary injunctions, and

v.

seeks an

granted only “in extreme cases Where

appears that irreparable injury will

District Court 0fthe Fifth Judicial District,

One who

Gem

State for

in other

work on

the

same project UCI was working
the

work done by UCI and

awarded UCI’S

fact that the client

Gem

UCI

State did not submit

it

Gem

t0 hire

State

been awarded the

any

facts or

Gem

Animal

evidence to suggest that

contract. In fact, there

State for

would not have been

sustained a substantial loss 0n the

would have been 0n any 0f the

State’s proﬁt

had the option

elected not t0 supports a ﬁnding that

have proﬁted off this job had

Gem

The

contract. Furthermore,

project, roughly $12,000.

what

0n.

Shelter

it

would

was n0 evidence

proj ects, in the event

it

as to

was awarded

the

work. The evidence 0f work performed in Blaine County was minimal. In over 14 years (from
2005-2019),

UCI worked 0n

existing client relations. Further,

Secondly,
lasting,

and

assertion,

met.

The

Gem

that there

Gem

TSA,

three jobs subject t0 the

0f which stemmed from UCI’S

none 0f these instances caused harm or damage

State claims that

may be

all

it

“may have

lost business,

a future breach and that

may

and the

it

Gem State.

effects

may be

long

On

this

result in lost proﬁts.”

State incorrectly concluded that the necessary elements

rule requires that

to

of Rule 65(e)(2) were

be apparent in the complaint or afﬁdavit that the commission 0r

continuance of some act during litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to

Gem

State only established three instances 0f

work

evidence that Violations would occur in the future
considered a successor of

down

the road

is

GSRAM.

subject to the

now

that

TSA

UCI was on

plaintiff.

and absolutely n0
notice that

it

was

Furthermore, the speculative nature of any possible injury

not sufﬁcient to prove the heightened bar 0f showing a risk of irreparable

injury.

Next,

by

Gem

the fact that

litigation.”

State attempted to

UCI was working

During

threaten or Violate

litigation,

Gem

show

in Blaine County.

UCI was

States’ rights.
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that the elements

The

of Rule 65(e)(3) were met simply

rule calls for a time frame

of “during

not working 0n projects in Blaine County that would

The only ongoing job was

the animal shelter in

which

money was being
that

UCI had

10st.

Gem

State provided

no evidence

that

new

bids were sent out

Gem

State again

either a preliminary 0r

permanent

accepted any additional Blaine County projects during

failed to provide

any factual basis

that

would support

by UCI 0r

litigation.

injunction.

Gem
Gem

State supplied

namely because

good

damage

Will

it

Gem

State,

denying

Gem

rise

up

in

any

real

way from UCI.

in the future.

Because there was n0 showing by

Gem

confuse

it

was
it

at risk

0f irreparable injury,

had suffered any damage, or

Further, there

was n0

State,

trial,

that there

was a

risk

that

indication that

The Court could not properly ﬁnd, based 0n

information, evidence, and the testimony given at

yet

State of that potential work, also Without

State could not establish that

had been impacted

relief,

UCI might

State surmised that

could not show that over the past 14 years

harm would

or

it is

Gem

evidentiary support.

Gem

no evidentiary support.

customers into thinking

its

be a basis for injunctive

State further argued that public confusion should

0f irreparable

the

injury.

which had the burden 0f proof, the claims

for

injunction relief were appropriately denied. Because no substantial or competent evidence exists
t0 contradict the District Court’s denial

2.

The

District

And

Properlv Refused To

The
there

relief.

District

was n0
The

threat

trial

Court Did Not Err In

Gem

Its

relief, this

Court should uphold that ﬁnding.

Assessment Of Iniurv Causing Behavior,

Award Iniunctive Relief.

Court appropriately found that there was n0 real injury causing behavior, and

0f injury, and on that basis properly refused t0 enter permanent injunctive

court has discretion t0 grant or deny an injunction and an appellate court Will not

interfere absent manifest abuse

P2d 988, 992

0f injunctive

0f discretion. Harris

v.

Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 517, 681

(1984).
State attacks the District Court for refusing t0 grant

enjoin UCI, despite the glaring lack of proof.
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Gem

State

its

had the burden

requests t0 permanently

to

produce evidence, and

Gem

further t0 establish irreparable injury.

UCI would

establish that

was doing

in Blaine

As

County violated the TSA. Likewise,

injury, a

a last effort,

“Virtually assures that

in Blaine

even

customers
itself t0

Who

it

Gem

State could not prove that the

State appeals to the rationale that because

UCI’S contract breaching

was bound

it

TSA

it

was made

because

it

it

it

clear that prior t0 this litigation

intent, 0r

it

company

did not believe

an indication that work

that relief appropriate.

was shown by

relief.

The Court Did Not Enioin “Minimal” Contract Breaching Behavior Because
Did Not Cause Iniurv.
The

District

Court properly denied

Gem

In order to prevail

must be proven:

A Contract existed between the parties
99’5”?

Defendant breached the contract
Plaintiff has been damaged because 0f the breach
Amount of damages
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It

State relief for breach of contract, because in

order t0 obtain recovery for breach, there must be damages.
contract cause of action, the following elements

Gem

Accordingly, this

Court should not reverse the District Court’s decision t0 deny permanent injunctive
3.

UCI

was only accepting jobs from previous

risk 0f irreparable injury

deny

it

There was n0 evidence

Without any solicitation from UCI,

the District Court’s decision t0

not enjoined

did not View itself as a successor

believed that because

directly reached out to

UCI was

activity will continue.”

County would continue. Ultimately, n0

making

UCI

injury, let alone irreparable injury.

be in breach. There has been n0 showing 0f nefarious

in Blaine

State,

if

could not

permanent injunction would be inappropriate.

believed itself (a) not bound by the

(b)

Gem

County caused any

0f continued breaching conduct. Further,

and

it

continue to d0 business in Blaine County, nor that the business

work previously done by UCI
Without irreparable

Stated failed in that burden because

0n a breach of

IDJI 6.10.1.

To

sustain a cause 0f action for breach 0f contract under Idaho law, a plaintiff must

prove each 0f the following propositions: “(a) the existence 0f the contract,
contract, (c) the breach caused

LLC

Berrjyhill

v.

burden

&

damages, and

(d) the

C0,, 154 Idaho 269, 278,

amount of those damages.” Mosell Equities,

297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013). The

amount and causation must be proven with reasonable

&

Gem

damages.

Gem

work

Gem

Gem

to

is

Gem State.

“damage” without
conclusion that

Gem

it

is

TSA

alone the amount 0f those

0f bidding, even where

UCI

did

fundamentally contrary to Idaho law on breach of contract.

was deprived of the opportunity

State extended

State

UCI’S instances 0f

and should resultingly be Viewed as causing

its

argument that

actually establishing any provable injury.

Gem

let

address the fact that n0 damages

fails t0

asserts that the very act

a Violation of the

State also asserts

not refer the work.

even the existence of damages

Gem State

This

Foxhollow

fundamental requirement t0 establish breach 0f contract

County as “minimal” but

instances.

not win the contract,

its

v.

1).

State attacks the District Court for labeling the

in Blaine

from those

“damage”

State failed in

State could not prove

Rather,

accepting

resulted

plaintiff has the

certainty.” Harris, Inc.

Trucking, Ina, 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 P.3d 400, 409 (201

In this case,

because

breach 0f the

prove that he was injured and his injury was the result 0f the defendant’s breach; “both

t0

Constr.

(b) the

would not have received

the

Gem

work because UCI did

failing to refer

The

work

also caused

facts in the record lend to the

work because

customers or clients that wanted t0 d0 work speciﬁcally With
existing professional relationships. In any event,

to get the

UCI

all

the projects

were

because 0f previous work or

State failed in

its

burden

t0

prove that the

actions 0f UCI actually caused injury.

As

a last note,

Gem

State urged that the conduct

was not minimally breaching because the

three Violating contracts are worth a net “$300,000.” This
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is

misrepresented. Obviously $300,000

is

not the proﬁt of the jobs that would be realized.

was paid $279,540, making up
running

at

And more

importantly, the job for

Which UCI

the vast majority of that $300,000 amount, during litigation

a $12,000 loss. There

was simply no evidence presented by

to the conclusion that the actions

0f

UCI

was

Gem State that could lead

caused any actual damage 0r injury t0

Gem

State.

According, the District Court properly concluded that UCI’S conduct did not result in recovery t0

Gem State.
The

District Court Properlv Considered Proﬁt Margins
Proﬁts In The Matter.

4.

The

District

Court properly considered

When denying Gem

State recovery.

competition clause

the

is

amount

Gem

State’s proﬁt

margins and lack 0f lost proﬁts

The measure of damages

that the plaintiff lost

And The Relation T0 Lost

for the breach of

by reason of the breach. Dunn

an
v.

anti-

Ward,

105 Idaho 354, 356, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Ct.App.1983). The measure 0f damages for loss 0f proﬁts
is

“rarely susceptible 0f accurate proof...”

Ryska

v.

Anderson, 70 Idaho 207, 213, 214 P.2d 874,

876 (1950). Therefore, the law does not require “accurate proof with any degree 0f mathematical
certainty....” Vancz’l

v.

Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105, 227 P.2d 74, 80 (1951). Damages need be

proved only with a “reasonable certainty” and

this

means

be taken out 0f the realm 0f speculation.” Anderson

&

“that [the] existence

Nafziger

v.

G.T.

0f damages must

Newcomb, Ina, 100

Idaho 175, 182—83, 595 P.2d 709, 716—17 (1979) (citations omitted). “The mere fact that
difﬁcult to arrive at [an] exact

not

mean

that

amount of damages, Where

damages may not be awarded;

Bumgamer v. Bumgamer,

it

is

shown that damages

resulted, does

ﬁx

the amount.”

for the trier-of—fact t0

124 Idaho 629, 640, 862 P.2d 321, 332 (Ct.App.1993) (citing Smith

Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718, 471 P.2d 571, 573 (1970)).

may be

it is

it is

considered by the trier-of—fact, if
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shown

t0

The proﬁts

realized

by

v.

the defendant

correspond With the loss of the

plaintiff.

Dunn, 105 Idaho

at

356, 670 P.2d at 61. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc.

v.

Johnson, 144 Idaho 844,

846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007).

Gem

State incorrectly argues that the District Court erred

amount of damages, despite the

no evidence

fact that

While proﬁt margin was discussed by the Court,

damages were not sustained by
“.
.

.Gem

Gem State.

is

a dollar

such a ﬁnding.

the sole basis for the ﬁnding that

stated:

any proof as to what its costs
been awarded the contracts... In addition,
n0 evidence before the Court as t0 what UCI’s proﬁts were 0n these

projects, other than

it

it

sustained a $12,000 loss. There

same

Moreover, there

loss.

is

Blaine has lost proﬁts during the years that

County. While
recession,

it

Gem

is

no evidence

been awarded the Animal Shelter contract that

State Blaine

sustained the

2018.

make up

State Blaine failed t0 offer into evidence

and proﬁts would have been had
there

The Court

t0

in the record existed for

was not

it

by refusing

Gem

UCI performed
its

had

Gem

would have not

insufﬁcient proof that

State Blaine’s business did take a

has since recovered and has had

it

that

Gem

State

services in Blaine

downturn during the

highest proﬁt margin to date in

show any correspondence between what

State Blaine has failed to

its

proﬁts would have been and UCI’S actual proﬁt, and thus has failed to take the

measure of its damages out 0f the realm 0f speculation.”
(R., pp.

375-376). The Court was completely aware that proﬁts should be considered in the

overall determination of damages.

proﬁts be a measure.

Had

The Court even

evidence 0f

Gem

cited t0

State’s lost proﬁts

have taken appropriate consideration of those ﬁgures, but
loss, likely

by

Gem

because

it

was included

in the

that evidence

0f

lost

been presented, the Court would

Gem

State did not present

suffered n0 real loss 0r damage. Proﬁt margins were

State, resultingly that

commenting

law directing

all that

any proﬁt

was presented

complete analysis, in addition to the Court

several times about the lack of evidence with respect to actual proﬁt loss.

Rather than recognizing

it

failed t0

meet

its

evidentiary burden,

Gem

State asserts that

instead 0f requiring proof 0f 10st proﬁt, the District Court should have ﬁrst determined Whether

Gem

State more-likely-than-not lost out

work. The Court properly

rej ected this
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0n work because UCI bid on jobs and performed the

approach. Rather, the Court appropriately held that

Gem

State did not produce

ﬁndings reﬂect

any evidence regarding

this conclusion.

its

likelihood 0f receiving the

The Court noted

work and

the Court’s

0f Violating work

that the three instances

UCI

did in Blaine County were the result of existing professional relationships, and previous positive

Gem

experiences with UCI.

State did not submit evidence regarding

testimony from the clients stating
support a ﬁnding that

Moreover, even
that proﬁt

it

if the

would have been given

it

would have been awarded any of the

What

its

bid price would be,

the contract, 0r anything else t0

three projects that

UCI

undertook.

Court had relied solely 0n proﬁt margins, the appellate courts have held

margins could be a consideration in determining Whether damage was sustained by the

claimant. Trilogy

Network

Sys. Ina,

v.

Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122

(2007).

The Court was provided n0 evidence 0f proﬁt
have obtained the jobs

margin

Gem

overall.

judicial system.

Gem

UCI worked

on,

State bore the

State failed to

and evidence

loss,

that

n0 evidence

Gem

State

burden the proof, a fundamental

meet

its

that

Gem

State

would

had an increased proﬁt
pillar

0f the American

burden and the District Court’s decision was

appropriate.

UCI’s Failure T0 Refer

5.

Have Gotten
The
contract,

District

The...

Court properly held that

which included the

plaintiff has the

Gem State “Would
Justifv An Award Of Damages T0 Gem State.

Work Is Not

Work” T0

burden

t0

Sufﬁcient Evidence That

Gem

failure to refer

State failed to establish

work

to

Gem

State.

As

damages

for breach of

previously noted, the

prove that he was injured and his injury was the result 0f the

defendant’s breach; “both amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty.”
Harris, Inc.

(201

1).

t0 the

v.

Foxhollow Constr.

&

Trucking, Ina, 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 P.3d 400, 409

The broad and long-standing general

amount 0f monetary damage
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that has

rule

is

that a Witness cannot state his conclusion as

been sustained by himself 0r another by reason of the

invasion of a legal right, without ﬁrst testifying t0 the facts upon which his opinion

Raide

v.

Dollar, 34 Idaho 682, 203 P. 469; Roseborough

see also 32 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 447(b), page 77.

23 Idaho 608, 131

P. 654;

Kirk

Sheep C0., 34 Idaho 327, 200

P. 678, Vancil

v.

It is

undisputed that

State failed in meeting

its

Gem

State holds the

burden.

Gem

and jobs With absolutely n0 evidence or
clients.

While the

show damages

District

Post Falls Lumber

v.

v.

&

Mfg. C0.,

Crane Creek

Gem

State

actual dollar

burden 0f proof 0n

made conclusory

facts t0 support the

it

was not up

claim for damages.

its

Gem

claim 0f damages 0r loss of proﬁts

UCI’S

State, or

Gem

statements regarding lost proﬁt

to the District

State suffered as a result 0f

properly concluded that the lack 0f bids by
State’s part precluded

facts. Id.

Court suggested testimony from the customers would be one

for lost proﬁt,

speculate as t0 what

Gem

McGuire

Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 102—03, 227 P.2d 74, 78

enough, claims 0f damage need t0 rely upon reliable

to

Whittington, 15 Idaho 100, 96 P. 437;

Madareita, 32 Idaho 403, 184 P. 225, and Cox

v.

predicated.

Conclusory statements 0f damage, 0r assumptions based 0n a “legal right” are not

(1951).

and

v.

is

way

Court t0 assume damages or
Furthermore, the Court

actions.

any evidence of cost and proﬁts 0n

an award 0f damages because the Court had n0 basis t0 determine an

amount of damages. The Court properly concluded

evidence to rely on, Which was not provided as evidence

that

it

needed some type of

at trial, resulting in its refusal to

award

Gem State damages.
The

6.

District

Court Properly Held that

Gem

State Failed In Its

Burden 0f Proof On

Money Damages.

Gem
damages.

State incorrectly argued that the District Court erred in

Gem

that in order to

support

its

State attempts t0 support this

prove damages,

argument by observing

its

denial 0f monetary

that the

Court mentioned

Gem State could have provided testimony of customers

damages claim. Damages must be proven with “reasonable
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0f UCI t0

certainty” and this

means

“that [the] existence 0f

Nafziger

damages must be taken out of the realm of speculation.” Anderson

GT. Newcomb, Ina, 100 Idaho 175, 182-83, 595 P.2d 709, 716-17 (1979).

v.

Gem

State relies

on Saint Alphonsus Diversiﬁed Care,

Inc.

v.

MRI Assam,

Idaho 106, 334 P.3d 780 (2014), for the proposition that a party seeking to recover

LLP, 157

lost

proﬁts

is

not required t0 obtain the testimony of the customers allegedly lost as a result of the wrongdoers
conduct, but

is still

Gem

State’s position is unsupported

required t0 meet

157 Idaho

at 116,

0f proﬁts

is

burden 0f proof,

its

334 P.3d

at

the decision in Saint Alphonsus.

by

prove

to

790. Trilogy further

its

damages with reasonable

conﬁrms

that the

rarely susceptible of accurate proof, therefore, the

Gem

State

certainty.

measure 0f damages for

1d,,

loss

law does not require accurate

proof With any degree of mathematical certainty, but rather “reasonable certainty.” Trilogy, 144
Idaho

at

846-47, 172 P.3d

The

drawn

accepting the work. There

at issue

Gem

that

work. Based on

would have been awarded

in the record, set forth

the contracts, but for

by UCI,

that established all

UCI

of the

existing client relationships. Further, all of those existing

reached out to UCI, With no solicitation on the part 0f UCI, to perform the

and nothing additional from

this evidence,

offered, testimony

from the

sole reasonable conclusion to be

The Court did not

State

was evidence

stemmed from UCI’S

clients speciﬁcally

would have

1121-22.

Court properly concluded that n0 evidence was presented that would allow

District

the conclusion t0 be

work

at

state that

drawn

clients, 0r

is

Gem

that

Gem

State regarding the price

it

anything else even remotely compelling, the
State

would not have been awarded

the jobs.

testimony 0f the clients was absolutely necessary for recovery, rather

the Court simply stated that evidence of

some

meet the burden 0f proof 0n damages, which
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sort

it

must be presented by

failed t0 d0.

Gem

Because there

is

State in order t0

no

substantial 0r

competent evidence in the record

were not proven should

to dispute this fact, the District Court’s

ﬁnding

that

damages

stand.

Monev Damages Are Not Recoverable When There Is N0 Proof Of Iniurv Or

7.

Damage.
The

District

Court properly held that

Gem

when

using the terms “minimal contract breaching”
forth, the

State failed to prove injury or

describing UCI’S conduct.

measure of damages for the breach of an anti-competition clause

plaintiff lost

by reason 0f

(Ct.App.1983).

A

claimant

the breach.

who

Dunn

v.

is

damage, despite

As

the

previously set

amount

that the

Ward, 105 Idaho 354, 356, 670 P.2d 59, 61

Wishes t0 recover for a breach 0f contract bears the “burden 0f

proving that he has been economically ‘injured.”’ Bergkamp

P.2d 941, 944 (Ct.App.1988). Thus, “the measure 0f

must be proven beyond speculation.” Wing

v.

v.

Martin, 114 Idaho 650, 653, 759

damage—

as well as the fact of

damage—

Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314, 321

(Ct.App. 1 984).

Gem

State incorrectly argues that

any Violation of the

proof 0f actual injury or damages. Throughout
for labeling the

argument,

UCI’S instances 0f accepting work

asserts that the very act

0f bidding, even Where

TSA

was deprived of

and presumes

“damaged.”

its

it

Gem State

UCI

TSA entitles

Gem

in Blaine

did not

t0

damages, Without

State attacks the District Court

County

Win

it

as “minimal.”

the contract,

is

Gem

State

a Violation of the

the opportunity to get the work, and consequently

attempts t0 use these assertions and presumptions as an unequivocal basis

to

recoup damages, but assertions and presumptions are not evidence, which

by

law.

Recently, in Melaleuca, Inc.

v.

what

is

required

Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 925, 318 P.3d 910, 915-916

(2014), the appellate court held that Without damages, breach

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF — Page 23

is

is

not sufﬁcient t0 sustain a cause

While the

of action for

relief.

actual injury

and damages must be proven

facts are slightly different, the legal

damages with the defendant’s duty
cannot be used as a “sword” t0
injury if

t0 sustain recovery.

conﬁrmed “Melaleuca conﬂates

In Melaleuca, the court

t0

prove defenses.”

entitle

premise applies conﬁrm that

Id.

oneself t0 damages.

the plaintiff’s duty t0 prove

The court
The

Id.

further stated that breach

plaintiff

going to assert damages as a result 0f the breach. Proof

it is

is

must prove actual

always required for

damages, they are not just automatically assumed when a Violation 0f a contract

Without proof, the

conﬁrmed

in

Dunn

Ward, 105 Idaho

v.

some proof of the defendant’s
proﬁts and plaintiff” s losses.
in

no recovery.

Gem
UCI,
to

Gem

Id.

670 P.2d

The court concluded

State alleged breach

State

at 62. In

Dunn, the

show any

that this failure in

and then asserted

that

was automatically allowed “damages”

how much. Gem

no amount 0f monies

the work, because

UCI

at 357,

not enough t0 recoup damages. This

proﬁts, but the plaintiff failed t0

it

lost,

had UCI not taken the jobs. The

With

is

Id.

is

also

plaintiff presented

relation

between those

proof properly resulted

all

the projects

based 0n those Violations 0f the

despite a lack 0f evidence establishing as

State, as iterated several times

or any reasonable argument that
facts lend to a

ﬁnding the

were customers 0r

TSA by

Gem

clients that

it

throughout this

would have gotten

State

brief, set

the

work

would not have received

wanted

to

do work speciﬁcally

because of previous work 0r existing professional relationships. The Court labeled

UCI’S conduct

as

“minimal” because in 14 years there were only three instances 0f work actually

performed under the TSA, and furthermore the amount of proﬁts realized by

Without a single

award

shown.

Id.

any dollar regarding

forth

0f breach

fact

is

Gem

State.

iota

UCI was

minimal.

0f evidence regarding loss or injury, damages were not appropriate t0

Furthermore, because of the fact that
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UCI had

sustained a considerable loss 0n

one 0f the projects,
otherwise,

Gem

how Gem

State

burden

was

difﬁcult for the Court to rationalize, Without evidence from

State

would have proﬁted

it

had the burden

t0 establish the

t0 establish

it

in the

Court’s denial 0f damages

it

The record

suffered.

Gem State t0

it

State

been awarded the job.

Gem

suffered actual loss or injury.

amount 0f any damages

competent evidence was presented by

same scenario had

Gem

had the sole

State

is clear,

no

substantial or

support any damages award, thus the District

was appropriate and should not be disturbed 0n

appeal.

Gem State Is Not Entitled T0 Recover Damage Because It Did Not Provide

8.

Evidence T0 Bring Costs and Proﬁts Out Of The Realm Of Speculation.

The

District Court properly refused to speculate about

based on the record before the Court. Even

wronged, he

may

what damages

if the plaintiff establishes that

t0

award

Gem

State

he “has been legally

not recover damages unless he has been economically ‘injured.

3”

Bergkamp

v.

Martin, 114 Idaho 650, 653, 759 P.2d 941, 944 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, “the measure 0f

damage—as

well as the fact 0f

damage—must be proven beyond

106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314, 321

App.

(Ct.

1984).

speculation.”

A

Wing

v.

Hulet,

person asserting a claim

of damages has the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also the amount
0f damages.” Martsch
v.

Scott,

v.

Nelson, 109 Idaho 95, 100, 705 P.2d 1050, 1055(Ct.App.1985); Bratton

150 Idaho 530, 537, 248 P.3d 1265, 1273 (2011). This

almost, if not every, issue

Gem

State brought

is

on appeal. Simply put,

the underlying problem in

Gem State

failed to

meet

its

burden of proof 0n damages.

Gem
just

presume

presume

that

State set forth a variety of ill-founded arguments, asserting that the Court should

it

would have received

it

would have made proﬁt, and/or

uncertainties due to

The law

is clear.

Gem

jobs, 0r

presume

shift the

State’s lack 0f evidence.

If a claimant seeks t0 recover
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that the costs

onus onto

None 0f

would be

UCI

the same, 0r

to bear

any and

all

these arguments are legally valid.

damages, they must ﬁrst show a right

t0

damages,

and then provide sufﬁcient evidences
evidence in the record was (1)
all

UCI completed

of Which were previous clients

who

without solicitation from UCI, (2)
three,

and

enough
alleged

Gem

its

UCI

in a

span of 14 years,

speciﬁcally to perform the

work and

took a substantial loss 0n the biggest project of those
in proﬁt

margins during 2018. These

was damaged nor

Network

Sys. Ina,

it

was so

v.

is

facts are not

the evidence sufﬁcient to bring any

Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007) in

similar t0 the factual scenario in the case at bar.

upon SaintAlphonsus Diversiﬁed Care,

was an

District Court’s reliance

incredible

Inc.

v.

upon

damage

facts,

calculation for

declined t0 speculate about What damages

recovery on the basis that

Gem

an award 0f damages t0

Gem

State conversely

0n Trilogy was more well founded. In

amount 0f information,

to formulate a

Gem

Gem

State failed in

State, thus this

St.

Alphonsus

veriﬁed and factually supported ﬁgures for

was n0 evidence

Gem

State

its

its

MRIAssocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 334 P.3d

proﬁt, loss, and proﬁt margins. In the case at bar there

relied

TSA,

Findings 0f Fact and Conclusions 0f Law, the District Court chose t0 highlight

780 (2014). The
there

UCI

State

three jobs under the

amount of damages out of the realm of speculation.

decision because

relies

Gem

damages out of the realm of speculation. The

reached out to

had an increase

State

to establish that

In

Trilogy

(3)

to bring those

State.

may have

The

the Court could have

District

suffered and

it

Court properly
properly denied

burden of proof. The record does not support
Court should not disturb the District Court’s

ﬁndings on appeal.

9.

Gem State Failed T0 Prove It Had A Protectable Common Law Trademark In
Blaine Countv For The GEM STATE ROOFING Mark.
Gem

Federal

State incorrectly argues that

Lanham Act deﬁnes

it

had a protectable common law trademark. The

a trademark as including “any word, name, symbol, 0r device, 0r

any combination thereof” used by a person “t0 identify and distinguish his 0r her goods
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.

.

.

from

those manufactured 0r sold

is

unknown.” 15 U.S.C.

trademark law and
Milling C0.

v.

§

others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source

by

1127.

The United

boundaries of

set forth the

Supreme Court described the

States

common law

purpose 0f trademark law

is

to protect the

identifying “the origin 0r ownership 0f the article t0

afforded to an entity through

good

Will that

trademark rights in Hanover Star

Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916). In Hanover, the United States

illustrated that the

which

principle of

good
it is

Supreme Court

Will of a trade 0r business

ﬁxed.”

Id. at

by

412. The rights

trademarks grow out 0f use of the trademark and through the

its

becomes associated With

the trademark. Id. at 413. Trademarks are treated as

merely a protection for the good will associated with the mark, and not the subject 0f property
except for the limited extent the marks are used in connection with an existing business. Id. at
414.

The United

trademark

When

States

it

Supreme Court

is

the

commerce;

the geographical limitation 0f a

where there

is

on a claim

article t0

for trademark infringement, the plaintiff must establish that:

owner of a valid and protectable trademark;

(3) the defendant’s

use 0f the mark

is

defendant used the mark in

(2) the

likely t0 cause confusion;

and

(4) the plaintiff

has suffered damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Nelson-Ricks Cheese Company, Inc.

Cheese Company, LLC, 331 F.Supp.3d 1131, (2018)
F.3d 1071, 1081 (9th

n0

trader t0 offer the article.” Id. at 416.

In order to prevail

it

Hanover summarized

stated “the mark, 0f itself, cannot travel t0 markets

wear the badge and n0

(1)

in

Cir. 2015);

Fortune Dynamic,

(citing

Inc.

v.

Adobe

Victoria

Sys. Inc.

’s

v.

v.

Lakeview

Christenson, 809

Secret Stores

Brand Mgmt,

Ina, 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010)). The core element of trademark infringement
“[p]r0tecting against a likelihood 0f confusion,”

which helps

t0

is

“ensur[e] that owners 0f

trademarks can beneﬁt from the goodwill associated with their marks” and “that consumers can
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among competing

distinguish

producers.” Nelson-Ricks Cheese Company, Ina, 331 F.Supp.3d

1131, (2018).

Gem

In this case,

UCI

State argues that the

TSA

validates

argued, and the District Court properly found, that

Rooﬁng” was not

cannot establish that

name,

it is

was broken down

protectable. This

it

was

ﬁrst to use the

not protectable because

it is

name, and

its

Gem

into

if

Gem

State

“Gem

State

Gem

State

(1)

was

inaccurate.

is

trademark

State’s

two components:

even

(2)

trademark. This

ﬁrst to use the

primarily geographically descriptive and thus cannot be

enforced to claim damages.

Gem State Did Not Establish First In Use

a.

In this case

UCI

set forth evidence, Via the

use 0f its trademark was in 1985.

was

in

November 0f

1997.

The

Gem

presented, the Court submitted

its

State presented evidence that

was

issue

location 0f use.

Gem

t0

ﬁnd

in favor

State bears the

At

trial,

ﬁrst use of

its

after all the

Findings 0f Fact and Conclusions of

insufﬁcient evidence regarding the ﬁrst use 0f the

County area

of Gem State 0n the

GSRAM’S

Idaho Secretary of State, that

name “Gem

State

its

ﬁrst

trademark

evidence had been

Law

was

stating there

Rooﬁng”

in the Blaine

issue.

burden of proof. Mr. Silvia testiﬁed

at trial that

he put his mark into

use in 1997 and he formalized that in 2000 With the business and he registered his trademark in
2002.

GSRAM registered its mark much earlier,

must submit sufﬁcient evidence
registration.

is

Gem

in 1985. If

to establish that ﬁrst use

State asserts that

it

ﬁrst learned of

not conclusive 0r even compelling evidence of

Rooﬁng mark

in Blaine County, as
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Gem

Gem

State

is

and overcome the

GSRAM in Blaine

when UCI

State asserts.

claiming ﬁrst in use,
fact

County

The 2002 year

is

0f UCI’S prior

in

ﬁrst actually used

it

2002 but
its

Gem

this

State

simply a statement 0f

when Gem

State ﬁrst

became aware, not evidence of when

GSRAM started using the mark.

The

Court correctly found that ﬁrst in use was not adequately ascertained With sufﬁcient evidence.
b.

The
trademark.

District

The

common law
level

Gem State Does Not Have A Protectable Registered
TSA Does Not Protect Common Law Marks.
Court properly held that

District

State did not

Court further correctly held that

Gem

have a protectable registered

State did not

have a protectable

Idaho Code Section 48-512 governs trademark infringement

mark.

and provides

Gem

Trademark, And The

that

common law

trademarks are analyzed under the federal system of

trademark registration and protection under the Trademark Act of 1946. Cohn

281 F.3d 837, 841 (9th

that

“Gem

State

Rooﬁng” was not

a protectable

Geographical and descriptive marks are not generally protectable.
does work in Idaho. Idaho
State is in the

is

commonly known

rooﬁng business,

Where a person adopts a term,
business,

it

v.

Petsmart, Ina,

Cir. 2002).

The Court ruled

Gem

at the state

as

and referred

as described in

its

common law trademark.

I.C. §48-502(2)(e).

t0 as “the

claimed mark.

Gem

It is

unfair competition in a court 0f equity.

American

entitle

Home Beneﬁt Ass ’n,

State

State.” Further,

uniformly held that

originally geographical and/or descriptive, as the

must develop a secondary meaning, which then would

Gem

name 0f

his

t0 protection against

it

Ina,

v.

United American

Beneﬁt Ass ’n, Ina, 63 Idaho 754, 125 P.2d 1010. There was no evidence produced of secondary

meaning by

Gem State t0 make its primarily geographical and descriptive mark protectable.

the only appropriate legal conclusion, under Idaho law,

is

that

Gem

State’s

Thus

common law mark

is

not protectable.

Gem State does not appear t0 be challenging the fact that its claim t0 a common law mark
is

invalid due t0

even though

its

its

primary geographical nature. Rather,

mark

is

Gem

State appears t0 be arguing that

invalid in terms 0f the general trademark validity analysis, the
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TSA

UCI from

functions t0 bar

0n

MWS

Wire Indus., Inc

support this contention.

submitting that invalidity as a defense.

State misguidedly relies

California Fine Wire C0., 797 F.2d 799, 800-04 (9th Cir. 1986) to

v.

In

Gem

MWS,

the court held that the parties expressly agreed to the validity

of the mark in question, thus holding that the complaining party estopped from asserting
invalidity Id.

its

802. These facts and express provisions in the prospective agreements are

at

materially dissimilar.

In the

State

TSA

Rooﬁng”

is

as a mark, nor

others, that renders

UCI

never an express provision that

recognize the validity of

there an express provision that

is

common law mark

contesting the

among

there

claimed by

MWS irrelevant.

Gem

The

State.

This

is

UCI would

is

refrain

from

a key and critical distinction,

pertinent terms of the

trademark validity and the applicable defense 0f invalidity

“Gem

TSA When

considering

as follows:

Neither party shall oppose the other party’s state 0f Idaho trademark

7.

registrations dated

May

2,

2002

in the case

Gem

December

29,

Gem

Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance,

State

Rooﬁng,

2004

in the case

Inc.’s concurrent

Rooﬁng”

0f

Inc.,

Gem

consents t0

Gem

registration

0f the word mark

Gem

State

“Gem

State

agrees and consents t0

use and registration 0f the word mark

effective in Blaine County;

State

0f Gem State Rooﬁng, InC., and dated
Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance, Inc.

State

State

Rooﬁng,

Inc.,

agrees and

Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance, Inc.‘s concurrent use and
“Gem State Rooﬁng" effective in the counties listed

in subparagraph 2(a).

(Tr.

Ex.

1,

p.

3).

As

stated initially, nothing in the

acknowledging the validity of

TSA

Gem

State’s use

0f

TSA

“Gem

explicitly provides that

State

Rooﬁng.” T0 the

UCI

contrary, the

merely protects the registered trademark 0n ﬁle With the Idaho Secretary of

essentially the logo only.

the ruling in

registration

UCI from

MWS, and

0n the mark

An

express provision recognizing the validity 0f a

that fact is not present in the case at bar.

(its

logo) t0 lapse. So While there

opposing the registered mark, there
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is

is

mark

Gem

no registered mark

at issue

is

State,

the basis 0f

State allowed

a provision in the

is

TSA

its

estopping

because the

TSA

simply does not address
effective,

TSA

Gem

State

“Gem

State

was forced

t0

Rooﬁng”

make

Because the registration

as the mark.

common law

a claim for the

Section 7 does not encompass the attempt t0 claim a

registered

mark was not simply

the

name “Gem

State

common law

Rooﬁng,”

it

was

is

n0 longer

mark. The language of
trademark. Further the
actually a

mark with a

logo and the name, taking the claim outside the scope of the TSA. Because the express terms do

common law mark,

not encompass the claim to the

very case law

Gem

to rule otherwise

State relies upon, that being “[C]0urts

rewrite contracts in order t0

make them

would be

in tension With the

d0 not possess the roving power

equitable.” Losee

v.

t0

Idaho C0., 220 P.3d 575, 579

(2009). Further, because Idaho law expressly governs per the contract, the Court’s analysis 0f

common law mark “Gem

whether the

State

appropriate. Further, the Court’s analysis

Rooﬁng”

overcome

State has

invalid and dismissing

10.

Gem State in its appeal brief.

produced n0 valid argument 0r pointed t0 any evidence in the record

As

this fact.

remains both applicable and

and determination 0f invalidity 0f the mark 0n the

grounds of geographically descriptive went uncontested by

Gem

valid,

is

such, the District Court did not err in determining that the

its

t0

mark was

claim for trademark infringement.

Court Did Not Err Under Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) In
Denving Gem State’s Request For Attornevs’ Fees And Costs.

The

District

The

District

Court properly denied

Gem

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5). The Rule
If the

was

motion

is

State’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant t0

states:

granted, or if the requested discovery

is

provided after the motion

ﬁled, the court must, after giving an opportunity t0 be heard, require the party

0r deponent

whose conduct

necessitated the motion, the party 0r attorney advising

pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making
the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment
that conduct, 0r both t0

if:

(i)

the

movant ﬁled the motion before attempting

disclosure 0r discovery Without court action;
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in

good

faith to obtain the

opposing

the

(ii)

party’s

nondisclosure,

0r

response,

objection

was

substantially justiﬁed; or
(iii)other

circumstances

make an award 0f expenses

unjust.

(B) If the Motion Is Denied. If the motion is denied, the court mav issue anv
protective order authorized under Rule 26(0) and must, after giving an

opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney ﬁling the motion, or both
t0

pay the party or deponent Who opposed the motion

its

reasonable expenses

incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not

order this payment if the motion

make an award of expenses

was

substantially justiﬁed or other circumstances

unjust.

If the Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part. If the motion is
granted in part and denied in part, the court mav issue anV protective order
authorized under Rule 26(c) and mav, after giving an opportunitv t0 be
heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.

(C)

I.R.C.P. 37(a)(5) (emphasis added).

A

grant 0r denial 0f attorney’s fees

discretion 0f the trial court. Idaho Military Historical

P.3d 1072 (2014).
courts’

Soc ’y,

Inc.

v.

ﬁndings 0n appeal.

was deferred

compel was only granted

rule provision,

which outlines

award attorney fees

rests

in part,

that a court

until the conclusion

making 37(a)(5)(C)

“may

Gem

trial

issue,’

9

award 0f costs and attorneys’
of the

the

trial.

Additionally, this

more speciﬁcally

applicable

implying the complete discretion t0

With the Court. This invalidates the “requirement” language and

argument emboldened through the entirety of
inapplicability 0f

Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329

Id.

fees in connection therewith,

to

within the sound

Absent an abuse 0f discretion, appellate courts Will not disturb the

In the order to compel, the Court indicated the request for

motion

is

Gem

State citing 37(a)(5)(A), costs

State’s argument.

would

still

Further, despite the

not have been appropriate t0

order under this rule due t0 the exceptions.

First the costs

were appropriately denied because

Gem

State ﬁled the

attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosures and discovery. After
State did send a

meet and confer

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF — Page

32

letter t0

UCI. After

that letter dated

initial

October

motion before

discovery,

17,

2018,

Gem

UCI

set

up a conference

call

which took place on October 24, 2018. During

the parties discussed the discovery deﬁciencies

responses by

November

6,

As

2018.

and agreed

6,

way

before ﬁling

its

motion

November

As

compel.

to

sufﬁcient, especially in light 0f the fact that

0n November

19,

which was not the

Gem

its

motion

t0

Gem

March

4,

was UCI made aware

State ﬁled

its

motion

that

t0

2019, Which supplemented

did not have an opportunity to

any deﬁciencies
to adequately

in

still

UCI

responses on

UCI

that the

insufﬁcient 0r deﬁcient in any

such,

UCI assumed

Gem

State submitted a second

the supplemental responses were

meet and confer

letter

its

N0. 2 be supplemented,

compel.

Gem

compel.

its

amend

State

regarding UCI’S

second supplemental

any of its second supplemental responses were deﬁcient

UCI

provided

its

third supplemental responses

responses t0 Requests for Production N0. 6 and

or supplement

its

responses because

it

exist, thus,

truthful in

its

7.

0n

UCI

was not aware of

discovery responses until the motion t0 compel was ﬁled.

meet and confer, and UCI was

simply do not

2018 were

its

that

second supplemental responses on November 21, 2018, and did not

receive another meet and confer from

until

was informed

State did not inform

State only requested that Interrogatory

subj ect 0f the

provided

responses, nor

6,

State

supplemental

2018 and made n0 mention of the supplemental responses 0r any

insufﬁciencies, instead,

UCI

Gem

2018 and produced additional documents.

ﬁrst supplemental responses dated

Gem

UCI supplemented

did not keep any diaries, calendars, notes, 0r journals.

November

telephone conference,

UCI would provide

that

to certain interrogatories,

this

Gem State

failed

responses that certain items requested

under 37(a)(5)(A)(i) and/or in their discretion under 37(a)(5)(C)

ordering payment of expenses would have been inappropriate, and the Court ruled appropriately
in

denying

fees.
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Furthermore, a portion 0f the documents and information

compel simply did not
clear that

it

did not maintain certain records, including calendars and notes

been deleted 0r disposed

of,

Gem

was

State believes there

true.

exist.

UCI

For

sought with

During the ﬁrst meet and confer phone conference,

exist.

in its response that the items requested did not exist and/or

it

UCI

maintained

this reason,

its

before the

ill-intent,

start

etc.

its

motion

UCI made

UCI was

t0

it

truthful

were not retrievable because they had

0f litigation, for n0 nefarious purpose. Just because

or believes that information

was withheld, does not make

responses and routinely reiterated that certain items sought did not

under

37(a)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii) and/or in their discretion

under 37(a)(5)(C)

ordering payment of expenses would have been inappropriate, and the Court ruled appropriately
in

denying
11.

fees.

The

District

The

District

which included
(A)

Court Appropriatelv Denied The Sanction Sought BV

Gem

State.

Court properly refused t0 impose certain sanctions requested by

shifting

burdens of proof in

trial.

The

For Not Obeying a Discovery Order.

Gem

relevant portion of the rule states:

If a party 0r a party’s ofﬁcer, director,

managing agent, or a Witness designated under Rule30(b)(6) or 3 1(a)(4),
obey an order t0 provide or permit discovery, including an order
under Rule 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue
further just orders. They may include the following:
0r

fails t0

(i)

directing that the matters
facts

embraced

in the order or other designated

be taken as established for purposes 0f the action, as the

prevailing party claims;
(ii)

prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing

designated claims or defenses, 0r from introducing designated
matters in evidence;

Whole or

(iii)

striking pleadings in

(iV)

staying further proceedings until the order

in part;
is

obeyed;

(V)

dismissing the action 0r proceeding in whole 0r in part;

(Vi)

rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or

(Vii)

treating as

contempt of court the failure to obey any order except
an order t0 submit t0 a physical 0r mental examination and
initiating
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State,

I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2).

Again, matters 0f sanctions are discretionary with the

trial

court and will not

be disturbed 0n appeal absent an abuse 0f discretion. Idaho Military Historical Soc ’y,

Inc.

v.

Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072 (2014).

Gem

State spent thousands of dollars t0

which “revealed nothing,

screened

it

available

documents had already been produced.

that (1)

for privilege,

documents responsive

as

UCI had

UCI made

it is

relevant documents after being put

already admitted” because

UCI’S business practice

0n notice of

and

digital information

all

clear during the discovery process

it

UCI

closed out because they are no longer needed.

is

0f UCI’S

all

t0 certain discovery requested did not exist,

notes and various other documents, and (2)

once a job

download

this litigation,

i.e.

diaries, calendars,

t0 delete emails

and ﬁles

never deleted emails 0r other

and

after the

duty t0 preserve

documents demand was made.

Gem

being told several times by

State, after

been produced, elected
conducting

its

gleaned from
ascertained.

search,

its

Gem

that is the reason

efforts,

State

Gem

spend thousands of dollars

t0

Gem

State

had

t0

that all responsive information

makes blazon
State lost

in fact

shortcomings 0f its case onto

UCI

State again roots

its

its

is

admit that there was not a single piece of information

assertions that

case.

The

no damages.

UCI was somehow

Gem

reality is that

Gem

not appropriate, nor

is it

is

Gem

party had deleted directly relevant communications which

could be

acting deceitfully, and

State could not establish

blame

for the

a legally sufﬁcient argument.

arguments in case law that

F.Supp.2d 1060, 1077-78 (N.D. Cal. 2006), case cited by

35

UCI

State attempting to shift the

neither binding precedent, nor

persuasive once carefully examined. In the In re Napster, Inc.
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had

email accounts. After

to access the

and n0 actual evidence of foul play 0n the part 0f

damages because there were

Gem

UCI

it

State,

Copyright Litigation, 462

it

was

had a duty

established that the

t0 preserve,

and knew

that

it

had a dutv

intentionally

t0 preserve.

This

Id.

and willfully deleted relevant communications

was well aware of

is

not the case, nor has

reliable

and factual evidence

this fact

during the hearing for sanctions.

Gem

Furthermore,

Gem

t0 support

State

is

its

Gem

contention that that

State asked the Court t0 shift

it

was unable

something

and

t0 prove),

Gem

damages goes
State’s

to (1) create the

State

was not

its

why

it

damage.

Gem

able to prove).

lost the case

State,

(Tr. Pg. 13,

11.

sanction, but if granted,

is

was

denying

Gem

it

because there

would

no actual evidence of bad

sanction

State submitted a single piece 0f

is

the case.

The Court recognized

so.

UCI due

to its allegation

Gem State’s proposed sanction

attributable t0

The implications of making

shift

UCI’s breach

(again,

the inference regarding

disturb the District Court’s ﬁndings

36

State’s inability t0

Gem

prove the very thing

it

not reasonable. The District Court recognized this

is still

it

a Wise decision to grant the sanction

an issue regarding the true nature and extent of

Court recognized that
State’s

sanction

it

has the ability to impose such a

burden 0f proof onto UCI, and because there

would not be

fair.

(Tr. p. 15,

Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse

State’s request for relief.
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is

Gem

did not believe

Gem

faith, that

rightfully denied.

at trial.

and

2-7). Further, the

it

it

some form of sanctions would

burden of proof onto

damage was

(2) that the

during the sanctions hearing in stating
requested by

after

Gem State had damages in the ﬁrst place (Which

assumption that

burden of proof on the key issue
is

and

of the case and ultimately the assumption would have supplanted

to the heart

was requesting

Had UCI

seeking a sanction that cannot reasonably be awarded,

0f discovery abuse. The District Court properly refused t0 do

would function

after litigation ensued,

the duty to preserve such information, then

absolutely be appropriate. But that

speciﬁcally

a critical distinction between the cases.

is

Absent an abuse of

0n appeal.

discretion, this

11.

its

8-20). This

discretion in

Court should not

12.

The

District

The

District

Court Did Not Err Under Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) In
Denving Gem State’s Request For Attornevs’ Fees And Costs, While Otherwise
Granting Gem State’s Motion for Sanctions.

sanctions for

Gem

Gem

Court properly denied

reimbursement for costs as

State’s request for

State’s alleged discovery abuses

by UCI. The Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure

state:

Payment 0f Expenses. Instead of or

must

in addition t0 the orders above, the court

order the disobedient party, the attorney advising the party, 0r both t0 pay the

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the

was

failure

make

substantially justiﬁed 0r other circumstances

the

award 0f

expenses unjust.

I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C).

As

set forth hereinabove, all orders

0f the Court were complied with by UCI, and

found they were not, costs are not appropriate because any
justiﬁed.

It is critical

granted in

State

full,

t0 note that

the sanction of reviewing

t0 rest its persistent

comply was

none 0f the “sanctions” imposed by the

thus any award of costs resultingly

was awarded

failure t0

all

became

of the

discretionary.

UCI computer

and unsupported accusations of discovery

if

substantially

District

Court were

Also pertinent,

Gem

ﬁles, but only t0 ﬁnally put

Violations. After doing a

complete

search of UCI’S computers, absolutely nothing additional to What had already been produced
revealed, supporting the conclusion that

the discovery process. Simply,

believe

UCI

Gem

UCI was

it

persists in

did not hide documents 0r refused t0 produce documents.

not be awarded to

Gem

State.

make

the

award
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had

t0

Gem

State.

UCI

its

refusal to

did not have

Because 0f this, costs should

The Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure require a disobedient party

pay reasonable expenses including attorney
other expenses

it

was

being truthful and completely forthcoming in

State is seeking costs because

additional documents and produced everything

it is

unjust.

37

fees, unless the failure

IRCP

37(b)(2)(C).

UCI

was

t0

substantially justiﬁed, 0r

did not disobey the Court’s order.

UCI was

ordered to provide

2019, Which

documents

it

t0

did,

full

and complete responses

t0

and those responses contain the absolute

Gem

on or before April

made

clear

when Gem

State

Gem

State

went through the hard drives 0f UCI’S computers and found absolutely nothing. As
phrased

it,

the expedition “bore

The

District

n0

Court did not

18,

were n0 additional

truth that there

This was

produce nor information to be provided.

State

fruit.”

err in

denying costs under 37(b)(2)(C) because

complied with and the sanctions proved

t0

be “not

fruitful”

discovery sanctions are committed to the discretion 0f the

its

orders were

and wholly unnecessary. Because

trial court,

and the ruling should not be

overturned on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion, this Court should afﬁrm the District
Court’s decision t0 deny costs.

Court Did Not Err Under Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2) In
Denving Gem State’s Request For Attornevs’ Fees Because UCI Was Justiﬁed In
Making Denials Of The Relevant Requests For Admission.

13. District

The
The

District

Court did not

err in

denying costs under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

denials of the three requests for admission

were

either, (1) accurately denied, (2)

0r (3) denied for other

Gem

State claims

form the basis

good reason. The

rule provides in part:

what

is

requested under Rule 36 and

the requesting party later proves the matter true the requesting party

who

failed to

award costs

denied With a reasonable belief in prevailing 0n the issue

Failure to Admit: If a party fails to admit

the party

to

if

may move

admit pay the reasonable expenses, incurred in making that

proof.
I.R.C.P. 37(c)(2).

The

trial

court has discretion in applying Rule 37 where the party

denial has reasonable grounds to believe the truth 0r veracity 0f

Idaho 890, 761 P.2d 1242 (Ct.App. 1988).
exceptions, speciﬁcally (1) that the request
that the

The

its

denial.

Ruge

v.

making the
Posey, 114

rule is mandatory, subject only to the four

was held objectionable pursuant

t0

Rule 36(a);

(2)

admission sought was not 0f substantial importance; (3) that failure t0 admit was based
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upon a reasonable

belief in prevailing

on the

issue; 0r (4) other

892, 761 P.2d at 1244. In addition, if the denials are based in

not substantive to any burden of proof, the

under the

rule.

Gem
fees

Carrillo

v.

trial

good reason.

114 Idaho

1d,,

at

or if the facts not admitted are

fact,

When imposing any

court has discretion

sanction

Boise Tire C0., Ina, 152 Idaho 741, 745, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270 (2012).

State Cites three requests for admission t0 support

under Rule 37. The speciﬁc requests were provided

its

argument

Gem

in

that

State’s

it is

entitled to

brief,

but for

convenience of this Court, are provided:

Request for Admission N0.

assumed business name

10:

“Gem

Admit that You [UCI]
Rooﬁng.”

are doing business under the

State

Admit that since 2016, You [UCI] have advertised,
solicited, bid 0n, and performed rooﬁng work in Blaine County under the assumed
business name “Gem State Rooﬁng.”
Request for Admission N0.

12:

17: Admit that despite Gem State’s written demands that You
Your rooﬁng business in Blaine County, You [UCI] continue t0
bid 0n, and perform rooﬁng work in Blaine County.

Request for Admission N0.
[UCI] cease conducting
advertise, solicit,

Gem State claims that each 0f these were proven true,
In order for

With respect

to

UCI

to

and

that is in fact false.

be required t0 admit the requests, the request must be completely

Request for Admission No.

12,

UCI would have had

to advertise,

and

solicit,

bid on, and have performed rooﬁng work in Blaine County, under the assumed business

“Gem

State

Rooﬁng.” Without

inserting conditions such as “and/or” the request can

UCI

any one of the ﬁve conditions within the question

is

not met. In this case,

nor did

It

was a determined ﬁnding 0f

it

solicit in

Blaine County since 2016.

customers reached out t0

Gem

State

based

its

UCI and

there

was absolutely no

argument for recovery 0n the

was performed by UCI

solicitation

fact that

in Blaine County, the phrasing,

Admission No. 12 condemns the basis
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for recovery.

it

was

true.

and

name

be denied

if

did not advertise,

fact that the

on the part 0f UCI. While

established that certain

and inclusions

work

in the request for

The exact same

analysis and reasoning

solicitation

were included

solicitation.

Furthermore,

applied in No. 17, whereby advertising and

is

in the request for admission,

UCI was

a justiﬁed basis for denying

all

and

UCI

never engaged in Blaine County

legally conducting business as

UCI, not

Gem State, providing

0f the admissions. Therefore denial 0f Request Nos. 10 and 17 do

not warrant fees under 37(c)(2). Essentially, the fact of the denial did not Change anything With

was put on

respect t0 the proof that had to be, and ultimately

the request

at trial; the

information sought in

was admitted Via other evidence and did not negatively impact

the case.

As such

despite denials that should have been admitted, 0r at least partially admitted 0r clariﬁed in an

exercise of

good

faith, the

Court found against awarding costs because the denial did not impact

the proof ultimately presented at

trial.

While IRCP 37(0) language does

direct that fees shall

be awarded,

this is

only absent the

existence 0f one 0f the exceptions provided in the rule and those exceptions are extremely broad

sweeping, as seen above. In the case
request for admission

committed

it

at bar,

was not required

to the discretion

0f the

is

no evidence or basis

Court did not

err

and

Gem

to

ﬁnd

State

to admit.

trial court,

absent a manifest abuse 0f discretion.

there

UCI maintains

is

S.

and

that

under the phrasing of the rule and

The imposition ofdiscovery sanctions

that ruling Will not

be overturned on appeal

Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n, 113 Idaho 526, 528. Here

that there

was

a manifest abuse of discretion, and as such the

not entitled t0 fees under 37(c)(2).

manifest abuse 0f discretion by the District Court, this Court should deny

award

fees

under Rule 37 accordingly.
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is

Without evidence of a

Gem

State’s request to

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS—APPEAL

V.
1.

The

UCI

Court Erred BV Denving Prevailing Partv Status T0 UCI.

District

submits that

UCI was

determining

any, prevailed,

is

when Viewing

not the prevailing party.

discretionary.

1994), citing Badell

v.

Holmes

v.

a Whole, the District Court erred in

the case as

A trial court’s determination as t0 which party,

Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787, 874

is

guided by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). For

not adopt a claim by claim analysis, but rather the question

comprehensive View, looking

&

2d 595

App.

(Ct.

Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct.App. 1992).

exercise 0f that discretion

Excavating

P.

the success

at

overall.

is

this

if

The

determination a court does

examined and determined from a

Eighteen Mile Ranch,

Paving, Ina, 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005).

Some

LLC

v.

Nord

speciﬁc considerations

can include the award compared t0 what was sought, what other damages were recoverable, and
the extent t0

Which the

parties

had a choice

in proceeding to

trial.

Zenner

v.

Holcomb, 147 Idaho

444, 447, 210 P.3d 552, 555 (2009). The prevailing party analysis includes offers ofjudgment,

though

it is

not the most signiﬁcant factor in the prevailing party analysis. Polk

v.

Larrabee, 135

Idaho 303, 313.

When reviewing Whether a trial

court abused

and determination, a three-step inquiry

is

its

discretion in the prevailing party analysis

employed:

(1)

Whether the

trial

court properly

perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) whether that court acted within the outer boundaries

of such discretion and consistently With any legal standards applicable to speciﬁc choices; and
(3)

whether the court reached

Soc'y, Inc.

v.

its

decision

by

the exercise 0f reason. Idaho Military Historical

Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072 (2014). Prevailing party determinations are

rarely disturbed

0n appeal. Shore
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v.

Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009).

In the present case,

yet the District Court

otherwise

is

theory that

State sued

UCI prevailed on

obtained neither.

determination

Gem

is

made

all

and monetary damages.

for injunctive relief

claims because

successfully defended against

it

all

It

claims,

a ﬁnding that neither party prevailed. This prevailing party

UCI was

erroneous.

UCI

clearly the prevailing party,

and

t0 issue a decision

an abuse 0f discretion by the Court. The District Court inappropriately relied on the

UCI

“breached the Trademark Settlement Agreement” as

Fact and Conclusions of Law, as a factor in determining prevailing party.
direct contradiction with the Idaho Civil Jury Instruction

Findings of

set forth in the

0n breach 0f

This ﬁnding

contract.

It

is

in

states as

follows:

INSTRUCTION NO.
The
1.

2.
3.

4.

_

plaintiff has the

burden of proving each 0f the following propositions:

A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;
The defendant breached the contract;
The plaintiff has been damaged 0n account of the breach; and
The amount 0f the damages.

IDJI 6.10.1 (emphasis added). Breach

damages and
because

it

(2) the

is

not a recoverable cause 0f action without (1) proving

amount of those damages. T0 make a ﬁnding

“breached”

is

an abuse 0f discretion because

it is

that

UCI was

not prevailing

outside the bounds 0f what a jury in

Idaho would be able to decide according t0 IDJI 6.10.1.

Gem

State sued

UCI

for breach

committed trademark infringement.
relief, as

UCI

0f the TSA.

Finally,

Gem

Gem

State further claimed that

State claimed that

was

entitled to injunctive

well as two-hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($220,000) in monetary damages.

successfully defended against the trademark infringement claim.

against

it

UCI

Gem

State’s request for a preliminary

successfully defended against

Gem
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UCI

successﬁllly defended

and permanent injunction.

State’s claim for

And

lastly,

UCI

Gem

State

monetary damages. Essentially,

did not prevail on a single issue in the Court’s Findings 0f Fact and Conclusions 0f

Judgment, yet

UCI was deemed not the prevailing party. UCI

submits this

In the prevailing party analysis, a court should not be assessing

but rather looking at the case in whole. In Eighteen Mile, the
the defendants

had successfully defended against

trial

is

Law

0r

in error.

on a claim by claim

basis,

court determined that although

plaintiff’s complaint,

because they recovered

only a small portion of What they desired on their counterclaim, they were not prevailing parties.
This was considered by the appellate court as an abuse 0f discretion. The determination was
reversed, and the appeals court emphasized that a defendant’s non-liability

the prevailing party. Eighteen Mile,

is

evidence that

it is

141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133; see also Shore

v.

Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009).

The

facts

0f Eighteen Mile parallel the

ﬁnding of prevailing party

status.

lawsuit brought against

it,

injunctive relief, in fact

no

UCI

facts in the present case

successfully defended against each and every claim in the

resulting in a

Judgment awarding

relief whatsoever.

These

party analysis.

found that

ﬁnding

is

UCI was

that

UCI was

its

is

State

n0 damages, n0

Eighteen Mile, Where the

entirety.

an indication that a party has prevailed and

UCI was

Gem

facts mirror

defendants successfully defended against the complaint in
Mile, non-liability

and strongly support a

As

articulated in Eighteen

included in that prevailing

not liable on any of the counts brought against

it,

and yet the Court

not a prevailing party. This decision 0f the Court should be reversed and a
the prevailing party should be made.

Another consideration that would favor

UCI being found the

prevailing party

what damages were claimed versus what damages were actually awarded. In Crumps

is to

v.

100k

at

Bromley,

148 Idaho 172, 219 P.3d 1188 (2009) after “considering the amount claimed by the Crumps and
the

amount

settled for in the stipulated
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judgment, and the foregoing authorities, the court

properly concluded that the
at least in part.” Id.,

was,

Crumps were not
148 Idaho

a prevailing party in the action, but rather

at 175,

219 P.3d

at

1191. This case outcome illustrates

another component in the prevailing party analysis that favors UCI. In the
court

drew a

distinction

how

illustrated

that

Crumps

inﬂuences the prevailing party analysis. Crumps sought two thousand eightsix

hundred ($600), while

Bromley sought four hundred ($400) and was awarded four hundred ($400). The
that,

case, the trial

between the amount claimed, and the amount of the judgment and

hundred and twenty dollars ($2,820) in damages and recovered

held

Bromley

based 0n the respective monetary outcomes, the

court

trial

was Within

appellate court

its

discretion t0

determine that Crumps was not the prevailing party but rather Bromley was. In the present case,

Gem

State sought

($0).

Gem

two-hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($220,000) and was awarded zero

State completely failed in proving

its

damages claim, While UCI succeeded

in

defending against the action. In applying the same analysis from Crumps, identifying what was

claimed versus What was awarded,

ﬁnd that UCI

UCI

is

this

Court should determine that the District Court erred, and

the prevailing party.

also submitted an Offer 0f

consideration in determining Whether

Judgment before

UCI was

trial in this

case and that should be a

the prevailing party. In the case

Zenner

v.

Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 447, 210 P.3d 552, 555 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court conﬁrmed
that offers

Idaho

at

0f judgment should be considered a factor in the prevailing party analysis.

Id.,

147

447, 210 P.3d at 555.

was an Offer of Judgment submitted by UCI

In the present case, there

ﬁve thousand

UCI made

dollars ($5,000) t0

Gem State.

The award

t0

Gem State was zero

an Offer 0f Judgment should be considered by

prevailing party. Additionally, because
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Gem

State

had an offer

this

in the

($0).

amount of

The

fact that

Court in determining the

to consider

(more than the zero

it

was awarded) had

acted reasonably and assessed the merits 0f

it

accepted the offer and an entire

its

case,

Gem

State should

have

could have been avoided. Trial was not the only option for

trial

the parties. In accordance With the reasoning in Zenner, the Offer of

Judgment should weigh

in

favor 0f UCI being held t0 be the prevailing party.

Even though

prevailing party determinations are left t0 the discretion 0f the

and not reversed save for instances of abuse of discretion,

this is a clear case in

0f the District Court’s prevailing party determination would be appropriate.

defended against every claim and
reasonable amount prior to

all

There

trial.

damages and
is

no

UCI

The

2.

ﬁnding

District

that

UCI was not the

Which a reversal

UCI

successfully

submitted an offer 0f judgment for a

clear reason, other than abuse

should not be the prevailing party. Accordingly,
the District Court’s

it

trial court,

0f discretion, that

it

respectfully requests that this Court reverse

prevailing party.

Court Should Have Granted UCI’s Motion for Costs and Attornevs’

Fees.

The

District

prevailing party.

action

is

Court erred when

it

denied UCI’S motion for costs and attorneys’ fees as the

Pursuant t0 Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), the prevailing party t0 an

entitled t0 costs.

The court may

fees, t0 the prevailing party 0r parties as

statute 0r contract.

In this case,

who

also

award reasonable attorney

deﬁned

in

fees, including paralegal

Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any

I.R.C.P. 54(6).

UCI

prevails, the court

is

the prevailing party as discussed at length hereinabove.

must comply with the

rules

0f

civil

T0 determine

procedure, which state in relevant

part:

which party

an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
sound discretion, consider the relief sought by the
The trial court may determine that a party t0 an action
respective parties.
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and on so ﬁnding may apportion the
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
In determining

the

trial

court must, in

its
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to

considering

all

0f the issues and claims involved in the action and the resulting

judgment or judgments obtained.
I.R.C.P.

54(d)(1)(B).

In

determining Which party prevailed Where there are claims and

counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines

is,

the prevailing party question

by-Claim analysis.

is

Who

prevailed “in the action,” that

examined and determined from an overall View, not a claim-

Eighteen Mile Ranch,

LLC

v.

&

Paving, Ina, 141 Idaho

t0 statute.

Idaho Code Section 12—

Nord Excavating

716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005).

UCI

is

entitled t0

an award 0f attorneys’ fees pursuant

120(3) compels an award 0f attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action t0 recover 0n a

commercial transaction. The

statute states:

In any civil action to recover

on an open account, account

stated, note, bill,

negotiable instrument, guaranty, 0r contract relating t0 the purchase or sale

of goods,

wares,

merchandise,

0r

transaction unless otherwise provided

services

by

and

in

any

commercial

law, the prevailing partv shall be

allowed a reasonable attornev’s fee t0 be

set

by

the court, t0 be taxed

and

collected as costs.

The term “commercial
except transactions for

deﬁned

t0

mean any

transaction”

is

deﬁned

mean

t0

all

transactions

personal 0r household purposes. The term “party”

is

person, partnership, corporation, association, private

organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.

LC.

§ 12-120(3)

T0

(emphasis added).

prevail under LC. §12-120(3), the commercial transaction

the claim at issue. Great Plains Equip, Inc.

466, 472 (2001).
a court

may

To determine

if the

v.

Nw. Pipeline

commercial transaction

100k t0 “whether the transaction

is

907, 912, 157 Idaho 980, 985 (2015).
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C0., 36 P.3d 218, 224, 136 Idaho

is

actually the

integral t0 the claim,

serves as the basis 0f the party’s theory 0f recovery

0n

must be the gravamen 0f

that claim.”

gravamen 0f a claim,

and whether the transaction
Sims

v.

Jacobson, 342 P.3d

In this case, the

gravamen 0f the claims

The Trademark Settlement Agreement

related t0 the

Trademark Settlement Agreement.

commercial transaction for purposes 0f

constitutes a

Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). The remainder of the claim, trademark infringement, also stems

from the commercial nature of the
lawsuit

stemmed from

parties’ respective businesses.

Thus, the entirety 0f the

a commercial transaction, warranting an award 0f attorneys’ fees t0 the

prevailing party.

Because the

and attorneys’ fees

District

t0

Court erred in determining prevailing party,

UCI. Failure

abuse of discretion. Accordingly,
is

t0

this

award costs and attorneys’

it

failed t0

fees in this case t0

award costs

UCI was

Court should reverse the District Court and ﬁnd that

the prevailing party, entitled t0 recover costs

and attorneys’

an

UCI

fees.

BV Denving UCI’s Request For
The Offer Of Judgment Was Made.

In the Alternative, The District Court Erred

3.

Attornevs’ Fees

The

Costs Incurred After

District Court erred in

after the offer

IRCP 68

And

denying UCI’S request for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred

of judgment. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 68 governs Offers of Judgement.

reads in pertinent part:

(d)

Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer.

(1) Claims for Monetary Damages. In cases involving claims for monetary
damages, any costs under Rule 54(d)(1) awarded against the offeree must be
based upon a comparison of the offer and the “adjusted award.”

Judgment to be Entered. After a comparison of the offer and the adjusted
(D)
award, in appropriate cases, the district court must order an amount which
either the offeror 0r the offeree

the

amount owed under

the verdict.

into account both the verdict

I.R.C.P. 68 (emphasis added).

judgments obtained by the
(2009) (quoting Jones

v.

must ultimatelv paV separate and apart from

A

total

and the involved

judgment must be entered taking

costs.

Rule 68 applies only t0 offers made by defendant and only

plaintiff.

Zenner

v.

t0

Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552, 558-559

Berezay, 120 Idaho 332, 334, 815 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1991)). Rule 68 in
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mandates an award of costs where an offeror makes an offer ofjudgment that

effect

by

the offeree and the ultimate result

Evans

v.

is less

Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931

Dewey, 109 Idaho 576, 580, 709 P.2d 149, 153
are satisﬁed, the

award of costs incurred

to a prevailing party

“shall

i.e.,

Idaho

at

favorable t0 the offeree than

under rule 54(d)(1)

be allowed

(Ct.

is

broad.

unless otherwise ordered

It

includes

Gem

(Ct.

is

the offer. See

conditions 0f Rule 68

mandatory. The award of costs

all costs,

but

is

also discretionary,

v.

McKamin,

141 Idaho 930, 932, 120

App. 2005).
monetary

State sought

$220,000. Pursuant t0 Rule 68,

relief in the

UCI

form 0f money damages

State

and the case proceeded

Gem

State.

to trial.

in the

amount of

submitted an Offer 0f Judgment in the amount 0f ﬁve

thousand dollars ($5,000) more than 14 days before

The Judgment

trial.

The

offer

Gem

was not accepted by

resulted in a denial for

all relief

sought by

Because the Offer of Judgment was more favorable than the Court’s Judgment,

entitled t0 costs, including attorney’s fees that are taxed as costs pursuant t0 Idaho

Section 12-120(3).

v.

the court.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Masters, 109

by

580, 709 P.2d at 153 (emphasis added); Stewart

P.3d 748, 750

is

made

rejected

App. 1986); Masters

When the

App. 1985).

after the offer is

(Ct.

was

is

UCI

is,

at a

minimum,

entitled to

its

UCI

Code

post Offer of Judgment costs and post

Offer of Judgment attorneys’ fees, and this Court should reverse the District Court in ﬁnding
otherwise.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

VI.

1.

Gem

State Should

Not Be Awarded Attornevs’ Fees

On Appeal Because Thev Are

Not The Prevailing Partv.

Gem
UCI

State argues for fees

does not deny that the

on appeal, predicated on

TSA

belief that

it is

the prevailing party.

contains an attorney’s fees provision, providing that the

prevailing party be awarded costs. However,
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its

Gem

State

was not

the prevailing party considering

it

failed to prevail

on a

single claim of the six

able t0 establish a Violation 0f the

showing of damages, Which
covenant of good faith and

was dismissed

at

summary judgment, and

argument

is

Gem

State asserts that because

t0 do. This applies to the claims for

dealing as well. Moreover,

fair

claims were both ruled against.
that further

brought.

it

was

TSA it is the prevailing party, but a breach claim necessitates

was unable

it

it

Gem

its

Gem

a

breach of the

State’s unjust enrichment claim

injunction claims as well as trademark infringement

State literally prevailed

necessary, based 0n the fact 0f

Gem

0n nothing. UCI does not believe
State’s total failure t0 prevail

and

recover.

2.

UCI Is

Entitled

T0 Attornevs’ Fees and Costs On Appeal

Idaho Appellate Rules 4O and 41 allow for an award 0f costs and attorney fees to the
prevailing party. Attorney fees

left

0n appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41

with an abiding belief that the

unreasonably,

01‘

appeal has

Without foundation. Durrant

638 (1990). Additionally,

UCI

is

v.

if the appellate

court

is

been brought 0r defended frivolously,

Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634,

entitled t0 recover attorneys’ fees

on appeal pursuant

to Idaho

Code Section 12-1208).
The non-prevailing

party,

Gem

State, acted

Without a reasonable basis in fact or law for

pursued an entire case, Which contained

the reasons presented in this brief,

namely

multiple claims, without meeting

requisite statutory

its

that

it

State brought this appeal, arguing fourteen issues, With

burden of proof. Therefore,

if

award attorney fees and costs

UCI

is

no justiﬁcation

for

the prevailing party in this appeal,

for the appeal
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burden 0f proof for any 0f them.

and the

District

Court action.

its

it

failure to

Gem

meet the

requests this Court

CONCLUSION

VI.

The
basis that

District

Gem

Court did not err in denying

all

State failed t0 provide substantial

burden of proof. However, the District Court did
rej ecting its

Gem

UCI

respectfully requests this Court

0f Gem State’s claims for failure 0f proof.

UCI

err in

DATED:

denying

UCI

at trial to

on the

meet

its

District Court’s decision t0 dismiss

UCI’S prevailing party
t0

UCI

status

and costs and

as the prevailing party.

July 28, 2020.

PICKENS LAW,

P.A.

By

Pickens Manweiler

/s/ Terri

Terri Pickens Manweiler,

Of the Firm

Attorneysfor Respondent/ Cross-Appellant

50

offer

further respectfully requests this Court reverse

and award costs and attorney fees
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its

prevailing party status,

their successful defense and/or

afﬁrm the

the decision 0f the District Court with respect t0 the

attorney’s fees arguments,

State’s claims for recovery

and competent evidence

motion for costs and attorney’s fees based on

ofjudgment.
all

of
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